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CENSORSHIP OF DEFAMATORY POLITICAL BROADCASTS:
THE PORT HURON DOCTRINE
I
THE N FOR REGuLATION OF PoLiTicAL BROADCAST G-SECMION
315 OF TEM ComumA.cioNs AcT
The use of radio and television in American election campaigns' has
paralleled the rapid growth of the broadcasting industry 2 Congress enacted
section 3153 of the Communications Act of 19344 to prevent discrimination
against any candidate5 in the use of the broadcasting media. Since the act
provides that broadcasters are not common carriers,0 they are usually free
to determine who shall speak over their facilities and to edit all programs.
However, section 315 requires a station broadcasting the political speech
of one candidate to grant to all other candidates for the same office an equal
opportunity7 to uses its facilities. But the section does not obligate licensees
I Approximately 10 million dollars was spent for radio and television time in the
1956 national election campaign. Brief for the National Association of Radio and
Television Broadcasters as Amicus Curiae, p. 6, Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union v.
WDAY, Inc., 89 N.W2d 102 (ND.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 810 (1958). In reply to a
recent questionnaire of the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters,
849 stations reported a total of 12,772 radio and television speeches by political candi-
dates during the twelve months prior to July, 1958. Petition for Certiorari, p. 9 n.3,
Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union v. WDAY, Inc., supra. It has been estimated that in
the 1958 New York gubernatorial election, 507 of the campaign budgets of the two
major parties was allocated for radio and television time. N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1958,
p. 23, col. 1.
2 There are now 4,175 radio and television stations in the United States and only
1,761 daily newspapers. The World Almanac 84, 485 (1958). There are an estimated
135 million radios and 44,500,000 television sets in the hands of the public. Brief for
the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters as Amicus Curiae p. 5,
Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union v. WDAY, Inc., supra note 1.
3 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1952).
4 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1952).
5 Section 315 is limited to broadcasts by candidates. Felix v. Westinghouse Radio
Stations, Inc., 186 F2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U. 909 (1951). Licensees
are free to grant time to the supporters of one candidate and to refuse equal oppor-
tunities to the proponents of his opposition. Therefore, the section should be extended
to include broadcasts by supporters of candidates to prevent such discrimination.
A candidate within the meaning of section 315 is one who is legally qualified to
ram for public office. In general, a candidate is legally qualified if he can be
voted for in the state or district in which the election is being held, and, if elected,
is eligible to serve. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 3.120 (AM1 broadcasting), 3.290 (FM broadcast-
ing), 3.590 (Non-commercial Educational FM), and 3.657 (TV broadcasting) (1958).
6 48 Stat. 1066 (1934), as amended, 47 US.C. § 153(h) (1952), FCC v. Sanders
Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
7 Simply giving candidates "equal time" on the air will not satisfy the equal
opportunities provision. The day of the week, the time period, and the potential she
of the audience must be considered by the licensees in determining what will constitute
an equal opportunity to the candidates. E. A. Stephens, 11 F.C.C. 61 (1945).
Because of the uncertain character of the concept, no fixed rule can be drawn. In fact,
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to carry any political broadcasts. Because this guarantee of equal oppor-
tunity would be almost meaningless if broadcasters were allowed to deter-
mine what the candidates might say over the air, section 315 further pro-
vides that broadcasters "shall have no power of censorship over material
under the provision of this section."' 0
The first amendment prohibits prior licensing of the press,11 and, there-
fore, the opportunity to express all political views through this medium is
theoretically unlimited. 12 But because the airwaves can accommodate only
a limited number of signals,13 only those licensed by the FCC may broad-
the Commission leaves the mechanics of the problem to the licensee and the candidate
involved. FCC Public Notice No. 58-936, Oct. 1, 1958, p. 4, col. 1.
8 Until recently it appeared that the FCC would classify any appearance by a
candidate on radio or television as a use of broadcasting facilities. See Kenneth E.
Spengler, 14 P. & F. Radio Reg. 1226b (1957) (letter dated Nov. 19, 1956, ruling
that the appearance of a radio announcer in his employed capacity constituted a use
when the announcer was a candidate for office); Hon. Allen Oakley Hunter, 11 Id.
234 (1954) (letter dated May 28, 1952, ruling that broadcasts by a congressman
in the form of reports from Washington constitute use of station facilities from the
time the congressman announces his intention to run for reelection); Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc., 14 id. 525 (1956) (letter dated Sept. 21, 1956, ruling that a radio
or television appeal on behalf of a charitable fund raising campaign by the President
while a candidate for reelection would constitute a use of station facilities). However,
a change in policy appears to have taken place. See Columbia Broadcasting System,
id. 722 (ruling that § 315 was not intended to afford equal opportunities to all
presidential candidates when the President reports to the nation on an international
crisis). See also Allen H. Blondy, id. 1199 (1957) (declaring that news coverage by
a television station of a ceremony in which a group of judges were sworn into office,
one of their number being a candidate for another judicial office, did not constitute
a use by the candidate). But see 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 761 (1957).
9 "No obligation is hereby imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of Its
station by any . . . candidate." 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315
(1952). Considered alone it would appear that under the provision broadcasters could
avoid the many problems created by § 315; but this avoidance does not appear
to be harmonious with the broad FCC policy of "public service broadcasting" which
requires fair and equal presentation of all responsible positions on important public
questions. "[T]he Commission has made clear that in . . . presentation of news and
comment the public interest requires that the licensee must operate on a basis of overall
fairness, making his facilities available for the expression of the contrasting views of
all responsible elements in the community on the various issues which arise." Edi-
torializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1250 (1949). This policy embraces
political broadcasting, and stations refusing to grant time for such broadcasting face
censure from the Commission and possible loss of license. Homer P. Rainey, 11 F.C.C.
898 (1947); Albuquerque Broadcasting Co., 3 P. & F. Radio Reg. 1820 (1948);
Letter From John C. Doerfer, Chairman, FCC to Hon. Samuel E. Stratton, July 30,
1958. But see Costello, Whose Interests Interest the FCC?, The New Republic, Nov.
24, 1958, p. 11, for an appraisal and criticism of the FCC's public service policy.
10 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1952).
11 See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
12 In reality the number of newspapers, and hence the quantity and quality of
political discussion, is limited by practical economic considerations. See Poynter, The
Economic Problems of the Press and the Changing Newspaper, 219 Annals 82 (1942).
Is See General Elec. Co. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 31 F.2d 630, 631 (D.C. Cir.
1929), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 464 (1930).
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cast.14 This governmental regulation of the broadcasting medium and the
vital importance to a democracy of an unfettered exchange of varied political
ideas necessitate the guarantee to all candidates of equal opportunityO to
express their political views over the existing broadcasting facilities. 10
II
C NsoRsnP OF DEFA ATION IN POLITICAL BROADCASTING
A difficult question raised by the application of the section is whether
a station is liable for defamatory utterances made by candidates in the
course of political broadcasts. The partisan nature of political campaigns
creates a greater danger that defamatory remarks will be broadcast during
political speeches than during other programs. 17 This danger is intensified
since candidates are not subject to any restraint by the station. Ordinarily,
broadcasters permit only their own carefully selected and trained employees
or the employees of responsible advertising agencies or commercial sponsors
to appear. Their actions are restrained by the possibility of economic and
professional sanctions for unethical conduct during broadcasts. No such
restrictions bind political candidates. Unless stations take precautions
against broadcasting defamatory political remarks, candidates are restrained
only by the threat of defamation suits and hostile voter reaction.
Some stations have attempted to censor political broadcasts18 in order
to avoid liability as joint publishers of defamation. Despite the apparent
clarity of section 315,19 there is a conflict of authority as to their right to
do so. In Sorensen v. Wood,20 the court held that broadcasters have both
14 48 Stat. 1081 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1952). Furthermore, the FCC deter-
mines the power and frequency that licensees may use, and the hours during which
they may operate. 48 Stat. 1082 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (192).
The constitutionality of prior licensing and radio regulation has been upheld as a
valid exercise of the commerce power. U.S. Const. arL I, § 8, Federal Radio Comm'n
v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933); General Elec. Co. v.
Federal Radio Comm'n, supra note 13.
15 Perhaps the equal opportunity concept should be modified. At least one leading
observer of the communications industry believes that the underlying assumption of
section 315, that granting equal opportunities to all candidates will best serve the
public interest, is erroneous. It is his contention that forcing broadcasters to give equal
consideration to Prohibitionists and Vegetarians as well as to Democrats and Repub-
licans prevents broadcasters from making free time available to the major candidates
to debate effectively the important campaign issues. Gould, Television Notebook:
Equal Time Headaches, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1958, § 2, p. 17, col. 1. Gould suggests
that a system should be devised whereby the amount of time assgned to a party
would bear some relationship to its strength previously registered at the polls.
16 See 67 Cong. Rec. 12503-04 (1926) (remarks of Sen. Howell).
17 Cf. Taft, Campaign to Stop the Campaign Smear, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1958,
§ 6 (Magazine), p. 11.
18 In this note the terms "political broadcasts" and "political broadcasting" refer
only to broadcasting by the candidates themselves. See note 5 supra.
19 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
20 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932), appeal dismissed sub nom. KFAB Broad-
casting Co. v. Sorensen, 290 U.S. 599 (1933). Accord, Daniell v. Voice of New Hamp-
shire, Inc., 10 P. & F. Radio Reg. 2045 (1954).
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a right and a duty to censor defamation. During the course of a political
broadcast Wood read defamatory remarks concerning Sorensen, the Attorney
General of Nebraska.2 ' Sorensen brought a civil action for damages joining
the speaker and the licensee as co-defendants. The broadcaster pleaded as
a complete defense a general order of the Federal Radio Commission22
denying licensees any power of censorship over political broadcasts.23 In
holding the broadcaster liable as a joint publisher of defamatory material,
24
the court rejected the defense of the general order on the ground that Con-
gress had not intended to prohibit the censorship of defamation.25 For six-
teen years the Sorensen doctrine remained virtually unchallenged, 20 and
21 Sorensen was accused of being an atheist, libertine, madman and fool. It was
further charged that Sorensen was actually involved in illegal gambling operations
while attorney general.
22 Section 18, unlike § 315, was not self-executing but required the issuance
of a general order by the Radio Commission to become effective. 44 Stat. 1170 (1927).
23 The wording of § 315, as originally enacted, was very nearly that of § 18. Felix
v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
909 (1951). The two sections are still very similar.
24 There is a split of authority as to whether broadcasting defamatory material
constitutes libel or slander. See Prosser, Torts § 93, at 586-87 (2d ed. 1955). The
most significant feature of the decision was the court's theory of liability. The
station denied any negligence and raised the defense of due care. Rejecting the
idea that liability should be predicated on negligence, the court relied on the theory
of strict liability as applied to newspaper publishers. See Peck v. Tribune Co., 214
U.S. 185, 189 (1909). Under this theory, a plaintiff need show only that the material
broadcast by the defendant was defamatory to establish a prima facie case. This
theory has been championed by Professor Void. He was amicus curiae in the original
appeal and counsel for the plaintiff in a second appeal. His part in the case is detailed
in an introductory note in Void, The Basis for Liability for Defamation by Radio,
19 Minn. L. Rev. 611 (1935). See also Vold, Defamatory Interpolations in Radio
Broadcasts, 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 249 (1940). A synopsis of his amicus curiae brief is
printed in 82 A.L.R. 1100 (1933). The theory of strict liability was challenged by
Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 725, 729-31 (1937). Professor Boblen
preferred to base liability on the absence of due care. This is the basis of liability of
book sellers and other distributors of printed matter. The early cases followed Soren-
sen. Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1934); Miles v.
Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933) ; Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61,
74 P.2d 1127 (1938) (dictum). But since 1939 the trend has been to reject Sorensen
and to apply a theory resembling negligence. Summit Hotel Co. v. NBC, 336 Pa. 182,
8 A.2d 302 (1939). See also Kelly v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 61 A.2d 143 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1948); Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Misc. 787, 38 N.YS.2d
985 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
25 "[W~e adopt an interpretation that seems in accord with the intent of congress
and of the radio commission. We are of the opinion that the prohibition of censorship
of material broadcast over the radio station of a licensee merely prevents the licensee
from censoring the words as to their political and partisan trend but does not give a
licensee any privilege to join and assist in the publication of a libel nor grant any
immunity from the consequences of such action. The federal radio act confers no
privilege to broadcasting stations to publish defamatory utterances." 123 Neb. at 354,
243 N.W. at 85.
26 Only a New York trial court dealt with the problem during the period. It
held that because § 315 created certain legal obligations limiting the power of
broadcasters to censor, they must be accorded a corresponding qualified privilege to
protect themselves against actions for defamation. Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broad-
casting Co., 179 Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
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broadcasters believed that they were legally obligated to edit and to censor
defamatory political scripts and to cut candidates off the air if they impro-
vised defamatory remarks. 2 7
However, in 1948, shortly before the first post-war presidential election,
the FCC challenged the Sorensen rule. In Port Huron Broadcasting Co.28
Muir, a candidate for reelection to the City Commission of Port Huron,
Michigan, made a broadcast in his official capacity, concerning a proposed
public bond issue. He was introduced by Black, who began with a bitter
attack on Mactaggart, another city commissioner. Mactaggart informed
the station that he would sue if it broadcast additional defamatory attacks.
Muir subsequently purchased time for a series of political broadcasts in
support of his candidacy for reelection. The station submitted Aluir's script
to Mactaggart who asserted that it contained defamatory and untrue state-
ments about him. Thereupon, the station canceled Muir's entire series of
broadcasts and refused to make time available to any candidate during the
campaign. Muir complained to the FCC, which, in connection with passing
upon renewal of the station's license, held a hearing on the complaint. At
the hearing, the station asserted that it had the statutory right to refuse
to carry political broadcasts.
The FCC decided that section 315 is operative once a station contracts
for any political broadcast, and that the broadcaster then loses his option
to refuse to air political broadcasts.29 The Commission further ruled that
the refusal to air Muir's speeches constituted censorship for defamation
prohibited by section 315.30 Furthermore, there was dictum3l to the effect
27 See De Grazia, Equal Political Defamation for All: Section 315 of the Federal
Communications Act, 20 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 706, 707-08 (1952).
28 12 F.C.C. 1069 (1948).
29 But see Weiss v. Los Angeles Broadcasting Co., 163 F.2d 313, 315 (gth Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948): '"These provisions are applicable when, and only
when, there are two or more legally qualified candidates for the same public cffice,
and a licensee has permitted one such candidate for that office to use a broadcasting
station, and another such candidate . .. seeks equal opportunities in the use of such
station." The implication of this language is that the first political broadcast for
an elective office is not covered by § 315 and that § 319 only becomes operative
after a demand for equal opportunities is made following the first broadcast. It
is submitted that the language in the Weiss case is unsound. It is clear that the
station's right to censor a candidate's script is circumscribed to a greater degree
when the section controls than when it does not. The first candidate to use the
station is thus deprived of equal opportunities. Compare 48 Stat. 1038 (1934), as
amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1952), with 48 Stat. 1066 (1934), as amended, 47 U..C.
§ 153(h) (1952). Section 315 should be amended to make it clear that it is to be
operative whenever there are two or more candidates for the same office and a licensee
either announces a policy of allowing political broadcasts for a given office or contracts
with one of the candidates for such broadcasts.
30 The Commission relied almost entirely on legislative history to support its
decision. For criticism of the Commission's interpretation of that history sc Warner,
Radio and Television Law § 34e (1948); De Grazia, supra note 27.
31 Technically, the entire opinion is dicta. After deciding that the Port Huron
Broadcasting Company had violated the law, the Commission granted the broadcaster's
petition for renewal of its license because of the previous confusion in the law and the
good faith of the station owners.
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that section 315 preempted the entire area of political broadcasting, and
that it thereby relieved licensees of responsibility for defamatory statements
made during political broadcasts.
8 2
The decision placed the broadcasting industry in a dilemma.83 If
broadcasters followed the Port Huron doctrine, they might face civil and
criminal actions for defamation in state courts; if they continued to censor
defamatory remarks, the Commission might revoke their licenses.8 4 Con-
demnation of the Port Huron doctrine by the broadcasting industry, Con-
gress,35 the judiciary,3 0 and legal commentators37 was immediate and
vigorous. 38 Nevertheless, the Commission reaffirmed the doctrine in 1951.89
WDAY of Fargo, North Dakota, decided to risk tort liability rather
than the loss of its license. During the 1956 campaign, WDAY granted
radio and television time to Democratic and Republican senatorial candi-
dates. An independent candidate requested an equal opportunity to use the
licensee's facilities and presented a script. The station believed that the
script contained defamatory statements, and it notified the candidate that
it would allow the proposed broadcast only if he made a formal demand
by invoking section 315. The demand was made, and the candidate was
permitted to broadcast the script as submitted.40 Thereafter, the Farmers
32 12 F.C.C. at 1073.
33 During the House investigation of the FCC the problem created by the Port
Huron decision was termed a "dilemma of self-destruction" for broadcasters. H.R.
Rep. No. 2461, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948).
34 Ibid. It should be noted, however, that the Commission has never refused to
renew a broadcaster's license because of a violation of § 315. But cf. City of Jackson-
ville, 12 P. & F. Radio Reg. 113 (1956).
35 See First Interim Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the Federal
Communications Commission Pursuant to H. Res. 691, H.R. Rep. No. 2461, 80th Cong.
2d Sess. (1948).
36 See Houston Post Co. v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Tex. 1948).
The plaintiff, as licensee of a radio station, brought a proceeding pursuant to § 402(a)
of the Communications Act to annul the Port Huron doctrine as an order of
the FCC. Although the court dismissed the proceeding, 'holding that the Port Huron
doctrine was not an "order" of the Commission within the meaning of § 402(a),
it showed hostility to the decision.
37 See Berry & Goodrich, Political Defamation: Radio's Dilemma, 1 U. Fla. L.
Rev. 343 (1948); De Grazia, supra note 27; Snyder, Liability of Station Owners for
Defamatory Statements Made by Political Candidates, 39 Va. L. Rev. 303 (1953);
Warner, supra note 30; Comment, 46 Ill. L. Rev. 626 (1951). For favorable comment
on the doctrine see Donnelly, Defamation by Radio: A Reconsideration, 34 Iowa L.
Rev. 12 (1948); Note, 58 Yale L.J. 787 (1949); 16 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 573 (1948).
38 A major criticism of the Port Huron case was that it was virtually immune to
legal attack. Because the doctrine was enunciated while the Commission granted the
petition for license renewal, there was no party directly aggrieved by the ruling.
Therefore, judicial review was impossible. Furthermore, the opinion was not an order
subject to attack under the provisions of § 402(a) of the Communications Act. See
note 36, supra; De Grazia, supra note 27.
39 WDSU Broadcasting Corp., 7 P. & F. Radio Reg. 769 (1951). See also WMCA,
Inc., id. 1132 (1952).
40 The script contained the following statements:
"The Farmers Union program fully carried out as planned, not as it is planned
by farmer members, but as it is planned by the Farmers Union dictators, would estab-
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Union, the chief target of the candidate's attack, sued the speaker and the
station as joint publishers.
The broadcasting company successfully pleaded the defense of privilege
under the federal statute. The North Dakota Supreme Court, in affirming
the trial court, held that section 315 prohibits censorship for defamation and
that no action could be brought against WDAY under state law because
of federal preemption of the radio and television field. 41
III
CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 315
In Sorensen v. Wood the Nebraska court stated, without citing author-
ity, that Congress had not intended to prevent censorship for defamation.
42
The FCC in Port Huron Broadcasting Co. cited substantial legislative his-
tory supporting the contrary position. 43 However, congressional intent as
reflected by the legislative history of the section is unclear 44 Therefore, in
lish a Communist Farmers Union Soviet right here in North Dakota.
"Both men [the Democratic and Republican candidates] take orders from Com-
munist controlled Democrat Farmers Union .... The Communists can't lose unless
the Americans wake up and wake up fast." Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union v. WDAY,
Inc, 89 N.W.2d 102, 104 (N.D.), cert. granted, 358 US. 810 (1958).
41 "[The defendant WDAY was required by Section 315 to permit the broadcast
of the ... speech. Power to censor the speech was denied by the clear and specific
language of Section 315. We cannot believe that it was the intent of Congress to
compel a station to broadcast libelous statements and at the same time subject it to
the risk of defending actions for damages!' Id. at 109. Accord, Lamb v. Sutton, 164
F. Supp. 928 (M.D. Tenn. 1958); Yates v. Associated Broadcasters, Inc., 7 P. & F.
Radio Reg. 2088 (N.D. Cal. 1951). It should be noted that the dissent in the WDAY
case also rejected the rationale of the Sorensen case. Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union v.
W'DAY, Inc, supra at 110. Rather, the dissenting judge accepted the Port Huron doc-
trine in principle, but said that the broadcaster's privileged immunity from suit only
covered cases where the speaker defames his opponents for office. Thus, since the Farm-
ers Union was not an opposing candidate, he contended that it had a cause of action
against the station. For statutory embodiment of this theory see lid. Ann. Code art. 7S,
§ 6 (1957). It is submitted that the dissent in the WDAY case and the Maryland stat-
ute are unsound because they base the broadcasters' liability on the fortuitous and un-
controllable circumstance that the speaker chooses to defame opposing candidates rather
than third parties who are not candidates for the same office.
42 123 Neb. at 354, 243 N.W. at 85.
43 12 F.C.C. at 1073-74. See particularly, id. at 1073 n.2.
44 Section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927 began as a floor amendment proposed
by Senator Dill of Washington. 67 Cong. Rec. 12501-02 (1926). The amendment, as
originally proposed, included a provision declaring that licensees would have no power
to censor, but that they would "not be liable to criminal or civil action by reason of
any uncensored utterances thus broadcast." 67 Cong. Rec. 12501 (1926). The immu-
nity provision was deleted by the conference committee, but the committee's report
gives no explanation for the deletion. See 68 Cong. Rec. 2561, 2S63, 2S66-67 (1927).
Supporters of the Sorensen doctrine point to this deletion as being condusive of the
position that Congress did not intend to prohibit broadcasters from censoring for
defamation. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 37. Under this reasoning congressional
intent as to the scope bf the censorship restriction is determined by Congress' intent
as to the grant of immunity. However, an explanation equally consistent with the con-
ference committee's action is that the immunity provision was not dearly drawn, and
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construing the section, the courts should look primarily to the object, pur-
pose and policy of the section and of the Communications Act as a whole.
Section 315 seems clearly designed to insure equal opportunity in the use
of broadcasting facilities for all political candidates, while the underlying
policy of the Communications Act is to regulate radio and television com-
munication in the public interest.4 r The effect of the Sorensen rule upon
broadcasters, candidates and the public appears inconsistent with the express
policy of both section 315 and the entire act.
Only two censorship policies are available to broadcasters under Soren-
sen. Either they must exclude all serious charges relating to the activities
of the candidate's opponent and others, and thereby limit information avail-
able to the public, or they must become the sole judges of what is defam-
atory and untrue. The editing of political speeches by broadcasters is
necessarily subject to their prejudices. 40 Therefore, a fair dissemination of
all political views would be prevented, and the basic policy of section 315
would be thwarted.47 Furthermore, the station's interests would be injured
since it would be jointly and severally liable for any defamatory statements
it fails to suppress. Even obtaining a legal opinion as to what constitutes
defamation may not protect the broadcaster since no legal question can be
finally determined except by litigation.4 8 The risk of liability could be
minimized by requiring candidates to transcribe all political speeches. 40
However, this scheme is objectionable because the delay in editing the tape
the committee felt that the immunity was implicit in the section even without the
provision. See colloquy between Senators Dill and Fess, 67 Cong. Rec. 12503 (1926).
This uncertainty as to congressional intent has been noted. "The Commission . . .
was faced with the task of divining the legislative intent of Congress when it appears
that Congress itself was, and still is, uncertain as to the purpose of the section. Refusal
by Congress to face in either direction [on the censorship prohibition] has, of course,
precipitated the whole problem." Berry & Goodrich, supra note 37, at 3W5. But see
Sen. Fess' remarks in 67 Cong. Rec. 12503 (1926). Between 1927 and 1955 there have
been at least 16 unsuccessful attempts in Congress to grant some form of protection
to broadcasters. Petition for Certiorari, pp. 17-21, Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union v.
WDAY, Inc., 89 N.W.2d 102 (N.D.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 810 (1958).
45 See, e.g., 48 Stat. 1064, 1082, 1083 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 303,
307(a) (1952).
48 See Donnelly, supra note 37 at 31-32.
47 The legality of a candidate's public actions, his political motives, and personal
integrity are not only legitimate, but often crucial campaign issues. Because statements
relevant to such issues are apt to be slanderous if untrue, the suitability of candidates
for office cannot be raised, except in clear cases, if censorship is allowed. See Port
Huron Broadcasting Co. (WHLS), 12 F.C.C. 1069, 1072 (1948).
48 Richard Allen Solomon, then the chief of litigation for the Commission, prepared
the majority opinion in the Port Huron case. In his testimony before the House select
committee investigating the Commission he said, "The only way you can tell whether
a given statement is libelous is by a court decision." H.R. Rep. No. 2461, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1948). The committee report contested Mr. Solomon's legal conclusion.
Ibid.
49 There is nothing in the Communications Act or FCC Regulations and policy
preventing licensees from requiring all political speeches to be filmed, taped, or in any
way transcribed in advance. H. A. I. Rosenberg, 11 P. & F. Radio Reg. 236 (1954).
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or film will tend to destroy the spontaneous and current quality of the
speech.
Another serious effect of Sorensen is that it would be extremely difficult
to decide promptly the subtle question of whether a station's editing con-
stitute's discrimination against particular candidates. Without a prompt
decision the candidate would be denied the opportunity of a corrective
rebroadcast during the campaign.
In addition, the Sorensen rule is contrary to the American tradition
of free expression since it allows the imposition of prior restraints.P
Although governmental regulation of political broadcasting also departs from
this tradition, such regulation is necessary to insure that all shades of polit-
ical persuasion are publicized.51 When so viewed, section 315 remains con-
sistent with the rationale of freedom of expression. However, if broadcasters
are allowed to determine what may be broadcast, there is a danger that some
political opinions may be suppressed to the detriment of the public. Recog-
nition of the fact that Congress was attempting to establish a policy con-
sonant with the ideals of free speech should cause the courts to reject the
Sorensen construction.
Finally, the Nebraska decision requires legal liability to be based upon
state law.02 If a defamatory statement is made over a nationwide network,
the defamed party could sue in the most favorable jurisdictions. The result-
ing "forum shopping" would be limited only by the question of whether
the proposed forum could gain jurisdiction over the network.53 Furthermore,
-o See Prosser, Torts § 92, at 573 (2d ed. 1955). Cf. Near v. Minnesota m reL.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (prior restraints to prevent the publication of scandalous
and defamatory material held to be violative of substantive due process under the
fourteenth amendment). The first amendment prohibition against censorship of speech
and press for defamation applies only to the federal and state governments and does
not forbid such activity by private individuals. See also Note, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 9S9,
1007-10 (1958). Thus, as a legal matter, censorship by broadcasters is limited only
by § 315 and the FCC policy of public service broadcasting.
51 See 67 Cong. Rec. 12502 (1926) (remarks relating to the advocacy of communism
during political broadcasts).
52 For a recent collection of state statutes specifically governing liability for
defamation by radio see Snyder, supra note 37, at 314 nnS & 56. For an excellent
comparative analysis of several of these statutes see Remrners, Recent Legisltive
Trends in Defamation by Radio, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 727 (1951).
53 The law of the place where an alleged wrong is committed determines whether
a party has a cause of action in tort Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 378 (1934).
The tort of defamation occurs whenever defamatory statements are communicated to
third parties. See Prosser, Torts 572 (2d ed. 1955). It would seem, therefore, that
the law of the state in which a defamatory radio program is beard would be applied
to determine the existence of a cause of action. See Summit Hotel Co. v. NBC, 336
Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939). Thus, if a defamatory political broadcast is received in
every state, 49 separate suits could be commenced against a network if jurisdiction
could be obtained in each state. See Note, 35 N.C.L. Rev. 535 (1957). Cf. Note, 28
N.Y.UL.. Rev. 1005 (1953). The multiple suit problem is illustrated by the cae of
Congressman Martin Sweeney who was libelled by a syndicated columnist. Sweeney
brought suit against the syndicate and against the newspapers carrying the offensive
column. The resulting problem is discussed in Donnelly, supra note 37, at 626-31.
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the geographical location of stations carrying the broadcast would determine
their liability.
54
If the interests of the broadcasters, candidates and the public are to be
safeguarded, the adoption of the Port Huron doctrine and the rejection of
the Sorensen construction is required.
IV
THE BROADCASTER'S LIABILITY FOR DEFAMATORY POLITICAL BROADCASTS
If broadcasters are denied the right to censor for defamation, the courts
must determine what liability, if any, may be imposed upon them. It is
submitted that broadcasters should be given a privilege similar to the quali-
fied privilege5 5 accorded news disseminators reporting governmental activ-
ities. Although they have no duty to report governmental proceedings which
include defamatory statements, news disseminators are privileged to do so.
The public's interest in obtaining accurate and full information concerning
public affairs warrants the privilege." The privilege protects the publisher
from liability as long as any defamatory and untrue matter is published in
a reasonable manner and only for the purpose of informing the public.
57
Since the underlying rationale of section 315 and the Port Huron doctrine
are also founded in the public's need for political information, a similar
qualified privilege should be accorded broadcasters.58 Indeed, the broad-
54 A hypothetical case will best demonstrate the different liabilities of broad.
casters under typical state statutes. Before he can be cut off the air T, a vice presi-
dential candidate speaking over a nationwide network, interjects into a carefully
censored script: "It is a well-known fact that my opponent's chief supporters, A [a
resident of California], B [a resident of Maryland), C [a resident of Virginial and
D [a resident of Washington] are all card-carrying members of the Communist Party
seeking the overthrow of our government." The statement is defamatory and untrue,
and the named individuals bring actions in their respective states against the network
and its local affiliated stations. In California the broadcasters would be liable in an
action for damages if they could not show the exercise of due care to prevent publica-
tion of the defamation. Cal. Civ. Code § 48.5(1) (Deering 1949). In Maryland tho
broadcasters would only be liable in an action for damages if the persons defamed
are not candidates for the vice-presidency. Md. Ann. Code art. 75, § 6 (1957). In
Virginia there would be no liability because the defamation was uttered during a
political broadcast. Va. Code Ann. § 8-632.1 (1950). In Washington the broad-
casters would not be liable if they required the submission of the script in advance
and had cut the speaker off the air as soon as reasonably possible after he began to
deviate from the script. Wash. Rev. Code § 19.64.010 (1951).
55 An absolute privilege protects a speaker from responsibility regardless of his
motive or purpose in defaming another, while the qualified privilege protects the holder
only if it is exercised for the purpose for which the privilege was granted. Prosser,
Torts § 95, at 606 (2d ed. 1955).
56 Wason v. Walter, L.R. 4 Q.B. 73 (1868). See Prosser, Torts § 95, at 606 (2d ed.
1955). An example of qualified privilege would be the reporting of congressional com-
mittee investigations, in which the parties to the proceeding are absolutely privileged to
defame others. News disseminators, as a legitimate exercise of their function, may pub-
lish a full account of the proceedings including the defamatory matter. The qualified
privilege is derived from the absolute privilege of the proceedings in order that the
public can be fully informed as to the work of the committee.
57 Prosser, Torts § 95, at 625-29 (2d ed. 1955).
58 See note 54, supra.
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casters' need of this privilege is greater since their facilities may be used
under legal compulsion. 59 The privilege, if pleaded, should be a complete
defense to any defamation action unless the station broadcasts a defamatory
speech for the purpose of destroying an individual's reputation. This privi-
lege would not limit the defamed person's remedy against the speakercO
Under the supremacy and commerce clauses of the Constitution, the
privilege would supersede contrary state tort law.0' However, the granting
of the privilege must not constitute a taking of property in violation of the
fifth amendment. Because there is no vested property interest in any rule
of the common law,6 2 it would appear that legal remedies are not property
subject to constitutional protection.0
However, petitioners in the WDAY case contend that even if the
broadcaster's duty not to censor political speeches was expressly created by
Congress, the immunity still would have to be expressly created. Thus, they
assert that even if broadcasters may not censor, no correlative privilege is
accorded.6
4
59 See Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.S2d
985 (Sup. Ct. 1942). See also 14 ALI Proceedings 161-64 (1936-1937); Void, Defam-
atory Interpolations in Radio Broadcasts, 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 249, 291 (1940): "Whether
or not there may be public duty to broadcast on some particular occasion may involve
difficult and delicate questions. If there is such a public duty, it would seem to follow
that a corresponding privilege attaches to the station." Professor Vold's position
is perfectly consistent with his stand in Sorensen v. Wood since the Nebraska
court, in construing the provision prohibiting censorship, found no public duty to
broadcast defamatory material.
60 Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 89 N.W.2d 102, 110 (N.D.),
cert. granted, 358 U.S. 810 (1958); Port Huron Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 1069, 1074
n.4 (1948).
61 Cf. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 US. 173, 176 (1942).
62 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
63 See New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917); Shea v. Olson,
185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936); Kansas City So. Ry. v. Van Zant, 260 U.S. 459
(1923) (by implication). But see majority opinion in Truax v. Corrigan, 2S7 U.S.
312 (1921) (Holmes, Brandeis, Clarke, Pitney, JJ., dissenting). It might be argued,
however, that federal preemption is barred by § 414 of the Communications Act,
which provides that nothing in the act shall abridge or alter existing common law
or statutory remedies. 48 Stat. 1099 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 414 (1952). It is sub-
mitted that this section is not applicable to the present problem because no remedy
is destroyed. Rather, a legal defense is created. But even should preemption be
viewed as the abridgment of a remedy, § 414, as a general saving section, should
not prevent preemption where it is a necessary concomitant of congressional policy
embodied in specific sections within the act. See O'Brien v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 113 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940) (by implication). In fact, the section has been
cited by no court as a possible barrier to federal preemption. See O'Brien v. Western
Union Tel. Co., supra; Lamb v. Sutton, 164 F. Supp. 928 (M.D. Tenn. 1958);
Yates v. Associated Broadcasters, Inc., 7 P. & F. Radio Reg. 2038 (N.D. Cal. 1951);
Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup.
Ct. 1942); Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 89 N.W.2d 102 (N.D.),
cert. granted, 358 U.S. 810 (1958). See also De Grazia, supra note 27.
64 Petition for Certiorari, pp. 11-12, Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union v. WDAY,
Inc., 89 N.W.2d 102 (N.D.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 810 (1958). The petitioner sug-
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Under petitioner's construction, broadcasters would be liable for the
wrongful use of their property by persons entirely beyond their control.
Thus, the mere ownership of a broadcasting station would be the basis for
the imposition of liability. This construction goes far beyond the rationale
of strict liability, which is based on the defendant's voluntary creation of
a risk where none existed before.65 This imposition of liability arising from
a risk not of the broadcaster's volitional making appears contrary to
recognized concepts of due process.60 Therefore, the Port Huron doctrine
would appear to be constitutional only if the courts imply a correlative
privilege to broadcast defamation.
V
TB:E QUASI-COMMON CARRIER STATUS OF POLITICAL BROADCASTING
O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co. 67 supplies ample precedent for
implying the privilege. 68 Both telegraphic and radio communication are
regulated by the Communications Act of 1934. The act contains no pro-
vision explicitly excluding the operation of state law. Nevertheless, the court
of appeals held that Congress necessarily granted the telegraph company a
privilege to transmit defamatory telegrams by making it a common carrier.
gests that the broadcasters could avoid financial ruin by insuring against the losses
which may result from denial of a privilege.
o5 See Prosser, Torts § 56 (2d ed. 1955). See also Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S.
185, 189 (1909); Sandstrom v. California Horse Racing Bd., 31 Cal. 2d 401, 420, 189
P.2d 17, 28 (1948) (dissenting opinion). In the Peck case Justice Holmes said, "If the
publication was libellous the defendant took the risk .... If a man sees fit to publish
manifestly hurtful statements concerning an individual ... the usual principles of tort
will make him liable ." Peck v. Tribune Co., supra at 189. (Emphasis added.)
66 Cf. United States v. One Model H Farmall Tractor, 51 F. Supp. 603 (W.D.
Tenn. 1943). The Government sought forfeiture of a tractor which had been used for
the transportation of liquor in an attempt to evade payment of federal taxes on alco-
holic beverages. The claimant-owner of the tractor showed that at the time the tax
violations occurred, the tractor was in the possession of parties who had converted It
without his knowledge or consent. The court refused to authorize the forfeiture.
"The construction of . . . [the statute] as authorizing a forfeiture of a vehicle In
which liquor was being deposited . . . with intent to defraud the United States . . .
though possession of the vehicle was obtained by trespass and without the owners'
knowledge or consent, would deprive the owners of their property without due process
of law .... " Id. at 605. See also People v. One 1941 Buick Sport Coupe, 28 Cal.
2d 692, 171 P.2d 719 (1946); People v. One 1937 Plymouth 6 4-Door Sedan, 37 Cal.
App. 2d 65, 98 P.2d 750 (1940).
67 113 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940) (Magruder, J.).
68 Ibid. See also Western Union Tel. Co. v. Boegli, 251 U.S. 315 (1920) (pre-
emption of negligence actions under state law against common carriers upheld). Cf.
Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445 (1948); Kansas City So. Ry. v. Van Zant,
260 U.S. 459 (1923). See Donnelly, supra note 37, at 34-37 for comment approving
the O'Brien analogy. For a criticism of the analogy see De Grazia, supra note 27, at
723 n.78. De Grazia contends that mere federal presence in a field under the com-
merce power does not justify preemption of all state jurisdiction. He distinguishes tho
O'Brien case on the ground that in the common carrier field a comprehensive frame-
work for liability of telegraph companies has been established by the Communications
Act. Moreover, he points out that telegraph companies need not transmit known
libelous statements, and are liable for damages if they do so.
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If the telegraph company were liable for the transmission of defamation,
it would be forced to read all messages and to investigate questionable
statements in order to protect itself. Since such precautions would disrupt
the efficient flow of telegraphic communications, implied preemption neces-
sarily resulted. 69
It should be recognized that broadcasters occupy a quasi-common
carrier status when political speeches are aired.70 The telegraph company
has a privilege to transmit any message unless it has reason to believe that
it is defamatory.71 And it has no duty to inspect messages for defamation.
But under the Port Huron doctrine broadcasters have a duty to transmit
even admittedly defamatory political speeches if they contract to carry any
political broadcast.72 Furthermore, the FCC asserts that stations have a
duty to contract for such broadcasts 3 Thus, broadcasters have at least as
great a need for the privilege as the telegraph company. To deny them
immunity would be to limit the number of political speeches in interstate
commerce because broadcasters would be likely to evade liability by curtail-
ing or even eliminating political broadcasts.74 Therefore, the recognition of
an implied privilege is as necessary to the congressional policy of favoring
political broadcasting as it is to the policy of an unburdened flow of tele-
graphic communication.
VI
PROTECTION op THE INDIV UAL FRo DEFAMATORY ATTACS
Even if licensees are immune from suit, they have a moral obligation-
and they should have a legal duty-to minimize the risk of defamation.
Under existing law and administrative ruling, broadcasters may require the
submission of scripts in advancej 5 They should be required to demand
scripts in advance and to warn all prospective speakers of their sole liability
for defamatory remarks spoken over the air. If a station believes that a
script contains defamation, it should require the candidate to invoke section
69 "Congress having occupied the field by enacting a fairly comprehensive scheme
of regulation, it seems clear that questions relating to the duties, privileges and liabil-
ities of telegraph companies ... must be governed by uniform federal rules." O'Brien
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539, 541 (Ist Cir. 1940). The above language is
equally applicable to broadcasting.
7o Cf. Note, S8 Yale L.J. 787, 790 (1949).
71 See O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940). Judge
Magruder suggests, however, that common carriers need not transmit messages that
their agents kmow to be libelous and non-privileged. Id. at 543. See also 14 ALI
Proceedings 161 (1937).
72 See Donnelly, supra note 37, at 36.
73 See note 9 supra.
74 Such a policy would bring broadcasters squarely into conflict with the Com-
mission's concept of public service broadcasting. See note 9 supra. Should the FCC
attempt to enforce its public service policy when the broadcaster is vulnerable to tort
liability in the state courts, it is conceivable that the federal courts, in reviewing a
denial of license renewal, might find the Commission's policy unreasonable in the light
of the alternatives posed to licensees. The public would suffer most by such a finding.
75 H. A. I. Rosenberg, 11 P. & F. Radio Reg. 236 (1954).
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315 by making a formal written demand. 76 These procedures would drama-
tize both the gravity of publishing defamation and the sole liability of the
speaker. Thus, the broadcaster would be forced to take reasonable steps
to protect the public. 77 The FCC has authority to issue regulations re-
quiring broadcasters to take such precautionary measures.78 If the WDAY
case is affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Commission should exercise this
authority. If the case is reversed, Congress should amend section 315 to
grant broadcasters express immunity from state tort liability, conditioned
upon a showing of a good faith attempt to discourage defamatory speeches.
Such action would further the goal of section 315 by promoting enlightened
self-government through responsible but unfettered political discussion.
HARVEY LYLE ZUCMAN
76 It has not been determined whether a station would be violating § 315
if it refused to allow the broadcast unless a formal demand was made. In the WDAY
case, however, a demand was made after a refusal by the station to broadcast tho
script in the absence thereof. Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 89
N.W.2d 102 (N.D.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 810 (1958). Cf. Lamb v. Sutton, 164 F. Supp.
928, 936 (M.D. Tenn. 1958).
77 Because the most diligent efforts to prevent defamation will not always be
successful, legislation is needed to help indemnify parties whose reputations are injured
during political broadcasts. Because of the social benefits derived from unfettered
political discussion, the public should help remedy the wrong. A federal fund should be
established to be administered by the FCC. Defamed parties who are unable, after
diligent efforts, to obtain full satisfaction on a state judgment against the speaker,
could make a claim to the Commission for the balance. It would seem that situations
requiring resort to the fund would be rare, and, therefore, the fund would not have
to be large. Such a plan would have the advantage of making the guilty speaker
financially responsible to the extent that his assets are subject to judgment as well as
insuring that the injured party is made economically whole.
78 5 Stat. 191 (1937), 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1952); 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as
amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315(c) (1952).
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